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Decisions from experiencea b s t r a c t
In choices between uncertain options, information search can increase the chances of dis-
tinguishing good from bad options. However, many choices are made in the presence of
other choosers who may seize the better option while one is still engaged in search.
How long do (and should) people search before choosing between uncertain options in
the presence of such competition? To address this question, we introduce a new
experimental paradigm called the competitive sampling game. We use both simulation
and empirical data to compare search and choice between competitive and solitary
environments. Simulation results show that minimal search is adaptive when one expects
competitors to choose quickly or is uncertain about how long competitors will search.
Descriptively, we observe that competition drastically reduces information search prior
to choice.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Whether the question is what to eat, where to live, or
with whom to mate, decisions are often made under com-
petitive conditions. This holds for species ranging from
humans to hermit crabs. Arguably choosier than humans
are about their housing, hermit crabs are always on the
look-out for new and better shells. Because the abdomen
of a hermit crab is extremely vulnerable, hermit crabs need
ﬁnd suitable seashells to protect their vital organs in order
to pass their genes on to the next generation. When a sol-
itary crab encounters an empty shell, it thoroughly
inspects the potential new home. The crab will meticu-
lously explore the outer surface of the shell looking for
holes and weak points. It will then insert its vulnerableabdomen into the shell opening to see whether the
potential new home is a good ﬁt. If the shell passes this
thorough inspection, the crab may decide to discard its
current shell and exchange it for the new one. However,
when a group of crabs simultaneously encounters an
empty shell, each individual crabs’ search process is dra-
matically truncated. In this competitive situation, the crab
nearest to the shell will make a split-second decision on
whether or not to take it based on a brief visual inspection
alone (Rotjan, Chabot, & Lewis, 2010).
Swap the hermit crab for a human and the shell for a
television on a clearance rack, and intuition suggests that
human behavior may be similar to that of hermit crabs’.
On a slow shopping day, the leisurely shopper can take
his time deciding whether or not to buy the television.
He can thoroughly examine the television’s attributes, look
up expert reviews on his smartphone, or take advantage of
the wisdom of crowds by soliciting advice from friends on
a social networking site. However, on a frantic shopping
day like Black Friday, the same shopper is likely to behave
very differently. Surrounded by dozens of other eager
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the television before deciding to grab it before someone
else does. Why might competition reduce pre-decisional
search so dramatically? What costs and beneﬁts do organ-
isms reap by reducing their search efforts in the presence
of competition? What factors in choice options and the
social environment affect good search rules? In this paper,
we seek to provide initial answers to these questions using
a new experimental paradigm that we call the competitive
sampling game.
Organisms rarely have complete and certain informa-
tion about options before making even the most conse-
quential choices; instead, they must make choices in the
darkness of uncertainty. To shed light on the available
options, they must learn about those options’ possible out-
comes and their associated probabilities through an
exploratory search process (Real, 1991). Most people go
on dates before proposing marriage, vacationers research
and compare hotels before deciding where to stay, and
hermit crabs inspect new shells before making a move.
After a period of exploration, organisms exploit an option
by making a long-term consequential choice. Exploration
and exploitation represent two diametric goals associated
with choice, namely, gathering information about options
(exploration) versus consuming an option (exploitation)
based on current information (Cohen, McClure, & Yu,
2007). Although exploration provides organisms with
more information, it can come at costs in the form of
money, time, or lost opportunities. There is thus a tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation: If you search too lit-
tle, you might struggle to distinguish good from bad
options. If you search too much, you may suffer from
excessive search costs.
In solitary choice situations, the exploration–exploita-
tion tradeoff has been extensively studied both theoreti-
cally (Brezzi & Lai, 2002; Gittins, 1979; Gittins, 1989) and
empirically (Gans, Knox, & Croson, 2007; Groß et al.,
2008), mostly in ‘‘multi-armed bandit’’ problems in which
individuals attempt to maximize their payoffs from multi-
ple gambles with initially unknown reward distributions.
However, previous research on the exploration–
exploitation tradeoff has largely ignored a real-world
search cost that dramatically changes how organisms
behave: the impact of competition during search. Although
search affords more information about available options, it
also increases the risk that good option(s) will be taken by
competitors.
In this article, we research how competition affects
pre-decisional exploration from a descriptive as well as a
normative perspective. The essence of what we study con-
cerns supply and demand. In a solitary environment, the
‘‘supply,’’ that is, the number of options available to choose
from, is stable. It cannot be affected by the actions of
others. Hence, a solitary decision maker can engage in
extensive exploration, allowing her to carefully separate
good from bad options at leisure before making a conse-
quential choice. In contrast, in a competitive environment,
‘‘demand’’ increases and the danger lurks that competitors
will claim desirable options, leaving the thoroughly explor-
ing decision maker with an inferior option set to choose
from. With the increased tension between explorationand exploitation driven by competition, decision makers
might be best advised to choose as soon as they detect
an option that is likely to be good enough. But when does
that moment come? Does search under competition
indeed become as truncated as the crab’s shell search
and the shopper’s television search suggest and, if so,
how good or bad are the resulting choices? To address
these questions, we take advantage of an experimental tool
that has recently been used to study the process of search
in a range of solitary choice situations (Erev & Barron,
2005; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Weber,
Shaﬁr, & Blais, 2004): the sampling paradigm from
research on decisions from experience (Hertwig & Erev,
2009). In this paradigm, participants explore options with
a priori unknown underlying probability distributions
before deciding between them (exploration before exploi-
tation). In the present research, we pit a solitary variant
of this paradigm against a novel competitive variant that
we call the competitive sampling game.
1.1. Decisions from experience
In the sampling paradigm, a solitary player learns about
(i.e. explores) options with a priori unknown payoff distri-
butions that differ in value by sampling outcomes for as
long as she wishes, without ﬁnancial cost. When ready,
she chooses (i.e. exploits) her preferred option on the basis
of her sampling experience. This ﬁnal choice then results in
a real ﬁnancial consequence, such as a random payment
drawn from the option’s payoff distribution. Since the
information decision-makers gain through sampling
reduces uncertainty about options and increases the likeli-
hood of choosing good over bad options, a key measure in
the sampling paradigm is how long people search for infor-
mation before making a choice. Given that sampling has no
cost other than time, one might expect solitary choosers to
sample extensively, but previous research shows that pro-
tracted search is not the norm. Across studies, participants
have generally been found to take between 11 and 19
draws, or about 7 ± 2 samples per option before making a
ﬁnal choice between two gambles (for a review, see
Hertwig, in press). Researchers have proposed several rea-
sons why people do not search extensively in solitary
choice: small sample statistics can be quite accurate where
differences are large enough to matter (Johnson, Budescu,
& Wallsten, 2001), frugal search reduces choice difﬁculty
(Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010), short-term maximization
goals prompt limited search (Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig,
2014), short-term memory constrains information use,
and opportunity costs mount as search continues
(Hertwig, in press).
1.2. The Competitive Sampling Game (CSG)
In this paper we introduce a competitive variant of the
sampling paradigm called the competitive sampling game.
In the game, players choose between two options realized
as urns on the computer screen. Each urn contains 100 vir-
tual balls, with each ball bearing a number. The distribu-
tion of numbers in an urn dictates its value. Before
making a ﬁnal consequential choice, players have the
1 We discuss other reasonable performance measures in Section 5. For
now, we note that for the two-gamble case, the probability of obtaining
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each urn by drawing random balls (with replacement),
one at a time, from either urn as often as and in any order
they wish at no ﬁnancial cost. When a player decides to
stop sampling and chooses an urn, she receives the
expected value of the distribution of numbers in her cho-
sen urn. In the solitary condition, players play alone, as in
the sampling paradigm (see Hertwig et al., 2004). In the
competition condition, they play in pairs. Each player sam-
ples independently but at the same rate, meaning that all
players see the same number of samples. As long as both
players wish to continue sampling, they both do so. As
soon as one or more players decide to stop searching and
choose an option, all sampling stops and the choosing
phase begins. Players receive the option of their choice fol-
lowing the rule of ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served. If only one player,
the ‘‘chooser,’’ decides to stop sampling and make a ﬁnal
choice, that player obtains her chosen option. This forces
the other player, the ‘‘receiver,’’ to accept the remaining
option. If both players simultaneously stop sampling then
one of two outcomes can occur: If players want different
options, each player gets the option of his or her choice.
If both players want the same option, the options are ran-
domly assigned to each player.
The competitive sampling game is akin to ‘‘games of
timing’’ (Dutta & Rustichini, 1993), in which two players
independently decide when to stop a game and seize a
reward while the reward either increases (preemption
games) or decreases (war-of-attrition games) over time.
An example of a preemption game is the ‘‘grab-the-dollar’’
game, in which two players have the option of either
grabbing the money on a table or waiting for an additional
period, during which the pot increases by one unit (Park &
Smith, 2008). The players’ dilemma is that they want both
to wait for a larger pot and to be the one claiming the
money. The competitive sampling game has the nature of
a preemptive race; here, the value of the options becomes
clearer over time, but the ﬁrst person to terminate sam-
pling can decide which option to exploit. Nonetheless, it
differs fundamentally from previous games of timing in
that players face uncertainty not only about the other’s
behavior but also about what is at stake—that is, the distri-
bution of each option’s outcomes. In other words, the com-
petitive sampling game is a competitive social game
(Hertwig, Hoffrage, & the ABC Research Group, 2013), rep-
resenting situations in which organisms need to trade off
exploration of the quality of options for earlier exploitation
in order to reduce the risk of the best option being
snatched away by a competitor. In the following sections,
we address the normative question of how much search
is optimal in different variants of the competitive sampling
game, and then describe the results of an experimental
study.option H is similar, if not identical, to other performance measures such as
the probability of outperforming one’s competitor. Additionally, assuming
that distributions are not heavily skewed, the probability of obtaining
option H in most cases should be very similar to the average expected
reward.
2 This assumption is made for simplicity. Although, on average, people
draw roughly equal samples from both options in solitary decisions from
experience (see Hertwig et al., 2004 Fig. 1), there is also evidence that
sampling effort is impacted by factors such as the variability of outcomes
encountered during search (Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012).2. How should accuracy and opportunity be traded off: a
simulation study
How should decision makers adjust exploration efforts
between solitary and competitive environments?To answer
this question, we began by making the followingassumptions about the choice ecology, sampling rules, deci-
sion rules, and social environment, respectively. Let us
emphasize here that our conclusions regarding good
sampling sizes in the game will be contingent on these
assumptions. In the discussion, we turn to alternative, more
elaborate assumptions and more complex environments.
2.1. Choice ecology
Each game presents players with two options with
two-outcome payoff distributions. Each distribution has a
positive and a negative outcome that occur with comple-
mentary probabilities. Positive (O+) and negative (O)
outcomes are drawn from uniform distributions ranging
from 0 to +100 and 100 to 0, respectively. The probability
of the positive outcome p(O+) is drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0, 1], while the probability of
the negative outcome p(O) is set to 1  p(O+). We deﬁne
the option in the pair with the higher expected value
as the H option, and we deﬁne the performance of a strat-
egy as its likelihood of obtaining the H option.1 For our
analyses, we generated 10,000 pairs of payoff distributions
and averaged expected strategy performance across all pairs.
2.2. Sampling rules
All players use a ‘‘ﬁxed-N’’ sampling rule, where N rep-
resents the player’s planned sampling size. A player with a
ﬁxed planned sampling size N will elect to continue sam-
pling until the N + 1 sampling round, at which point he will
stop search and choose. Players distribute their samples
equally,2 between the two options except where N is odd,
in which case the player will allocate one additional sample
to a randomly chosen option. Strategies with small N values
dictate little exploration prior to exploitation, while those
with large N values mandate extensive exploration. We cal-
culated expected performance for ﬁxed-N strategies with
planned sampling sizes ranging from 1 to 50.
2.3. Decision rules
Given a pair of players, the player with the smaller
planned sampling size is the chooser in the game and gets
to decide which option to take. The player with the larger
planned sampling size is the receiver and automatically
receives the remaining option that was not chosen by their
competitor. Choosers choose the option that has the high-
est observed sample mean (i.e., highest mean reward). This
rule has been proposed in the context of n-armed bandit
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ing the values of actions such as the play of one of a slot
machine’s levers, and for using the estimates to select an
action (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Unlike in n-armed bandit
problems, in the sampling paradigm as studied here, the
outcomes in the sampling stage inform the players about
the value of an option but do not yet represent actual
rewards (that is, sampling is exogenous; Denrell, 2007).
In the case that players sample only once, and thus
observe an outcome from one option only, they use the
following decision rule: If the sample is positive, choose that
option, if the sample is negative, choose the other option. This
rule is in the spirit of the win-stay, lose-shift strategy that
has been shown to be effective in repeated games environ-
ments (e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). We refer to our vari-
ant of this strategy as the take-good-enough, otherwise-shift
strategy. It speciﬁes that a player will take an observed
option if the sample was satisfying (any positive value in
our simulation), otherwisehewill reject theobservedoption
and take the alternative, unobserved option.32.4. Social environments
The cost of sampling in competitive environments is
likely to depend on the probability that a desirable option
will be scooped up by a competitor. For this reason, we
expect that the performance of sampling strategies will
depend on the speciﬁc social environment an organism is
in. To measure how competitors’ decision speed affects
the performance of different levels of search, we simulated
choice performance in four different social environments.
Mathematically, we deﬁned social environments in terms
of the probability distribution of opponents’ sampling
sizes. We generated four social environments: a slow envi-
ronment in which competitors tend to have large sampling
sizes and thus require extensive information before mak-
ing a decision; a fast environment in which competitors
tend to have small sampling sizes and are primarily moti-
vated to not let good options slip away; an uncertain envi-
ronment where competitors vary equally between small,
medium, and large sampling sizes; and an as-if solitary
environment that consisted of searchers taken from the
original Hertwig et al. (2004) study on solitary decisions
from experience. This environment is called as-if solitary
because competitors behave as if they are in a solitary
environment. To the extent that competition will likely
reduce search, the as-if solitary environment represents
one possible distributional upper bound on how long indi-
viduals will search under competition.
2.5. Simulation results
We show mean performance results across 10,000 ran-
domly generated pairs of payoff distributions drawn from3 Importantly, this rule assumes no uncertainty aversion (Ellsberg, 1961),
in that players do not hesitate to take a completely unobserved option
when an observed option is found to contain negative outcomes. In the
empirical study, we test this assumption (and ﬁnd evidence against it).
However, for the purposes of simplicity we maintain the assumption in
determining good sampling sizes in the simulation.the aforementioned choice ecology (see Appendix A for
details). Again, the benchmark used to assess the perfor-
mance of a sampling rule is the probability that an agent
obtains the option with the higher expected value in a
gamble pair (the H option). We present the simulation
results in three sections. First, we contrast expected out-
comes for agents who are choosers versus agents who
are receivers in a game as a function of the number of sam-
pling rounds in that game. Second, we demonstrate an
imbalance in the costs of oversampling versus undersam-
pling. Finally, taking into account this imbalance in costs,
we derive the best search length for each social
environment.
To what extent does being the chooser (i.e., the one
whose planned sampling size is smallest) increase the like-
lihood of obtaining the H option? Is it always good to be
the chooser in a game or is it sometimes better to be the
receiver and allow a competitor to choose? To answer this
question, we calculated the probability that an agent
obtains the H option given that he ends the game as the
chooser across sampling rounds 1–50.4 In other words,
assuming the game lasts for x sampling rounds, what is
the probability that an agent obtains the H option if he or
she is the chooser in the game? Fig. 1 shows the expected
outcomes for choosers compared to receivers across rounds
1–50. Recall that, as our implementation of the competitive
sampling game requires that the receiver take the option not
chosen, the probability that the receiver obtains the H option
is simply the complement of the probability that the chooser
chose it.
We draw twomain conclusions from the data presented
in Fig. 1. First, across all sampling rounds, choosers are
always expected to obtain the H option with probability
greater than .50. Because receivers receive the H option
with the compliment of the chooser’s probability, receivers
always obtain the H option with a probability less than .50.
No matter how few samples one takes, the expected out-
come of being a chooser is always better than the expected
outcome of being a receiver. Second, the probability that a
chooser obtains the H option increases monotonically with
additional sampling rounds, but with marginally decreas-
ing gains. In other words, the gain in information a chooser
gets from an additional sample in early sampling rounds is
larger than the gain in later sampling rounds. From these
two ﬁndings, it follows that it is always better to have
more sampling rounds as long as one ends the game as
the chooser. In Fig. 1, this means that an agent should try
to get as far to the right on the choosing line as possible
without being ‘‘scooped’’ and dropping down to the
increasingly negative receiving line.
These ﬁndings also allow us to construct an optimal
sampling rule for an omnipotent player who knows how
long her competitor plans to sample. If the omnipotent
player knows that his competitor has a ﬁxed and known
planned sampling size of nc, then his best sampling size
is nc  1 (or 1 when nc = 1). Of course, most people are
not omnipotent and do not have perfect knowledge of their4 Hertwig and Pleskac (2010) conducted a very similar simulation that
paralleled ours (in the case where a player is always the chooser). Our
results are virtually identical.
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Fig. 2. Probability that an agent obtains the H option given the agent’s
planned sampling size and the competitor’s planned sampling size. The
ﬁgure shows mean values over 10,000 randomly generated two-outcome
gambles.
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people will base their sampling decisions on their expecta-
tions of their competitors’ behavior, where expectations
are deﬁned as a probability distribution over sampling
sizes. In other words, players could ask themselves:
‘‘How likely is my competitor going to stop search on each
sampling round? Once a player has these expectations, she
then needs to take into account the costs of over- versus
undersampling. If the costs of undersampling (deciding
too quickly) are larger than the costs of oversampling
(deciding too slowly), then a player should err on the side
of sampling too much relative to her expectations of her
opponent. On the other hand, if the costs of undersampling
are smaller than the costs of oversampling, then the player
should shorten her search relative to her expectations of
her opponent.
To determine the relative costs of over- versus under-
sampling in the competitive sampling game, we calculated
the expected choice performance of an agent given all
combinations of planned sampling sizes from 1 to 10 that
an agent and his or her competitor might implement.
These data are presented in Fig. 2, where the x-axis repre-
sents an agent’s planned sampling size and the y-axis rep-
resents a competitor’s planned sampling size.
Consistent with our previous conclusion, Fig. 2 shows
that for any competitor’s planned sampling size nc, an
agent’s best planned sampling size, na, equals nc  1 (or 1
when nc = 1). For example, if a competitor’s planned sam-
pling size is 8, the best planned sampling size for the agent
is 7, with an 83% chance of obtaining option H. However,
consider the cost of over- versus undersampling against
this competitor. If the agent undersamples by 2, with a
planned sampling size of 5, he will still be the chooser in
the game and have an 80% chance of obtaining option
H—a drop of only 3 percentage points relative to the best
possible outcome. If, on the other hand, the agent oversam-
ples by 2, with a planned sampling size of 9, he will be the
receiver in the game and will have only a 16% chance of




















Fig. 1. Mean probability that an agent obtains the H option given that the
game stops at a speciﬁed sampling round across 10,000 gambles. The
choosing line shows the probability for the chooser, the player with
the larger planned sampling size, while the receiving line shows the
probability for the receiver, the player with the smaller planned sampling
size.These results show that the cost of oversampling is much
larger than the cost of undersampling: it is always better
to undersample (by any amount) and keep the chooser
advantage, than to oversample (by even one sample) and
suffer the receiver disadvantage.
Given that it is better to err on the side of undersam-
pling versus oversampling, how should an individual
behave in different social environments? In other words,
how little should one sample before making a decision
given certain expectations about the behavior of competi-
tors? To answer this, we calculated a player’s expected
probability of obtaining the H option given his or her
planned sampling size within each of the four social envi-
ronments (see Appendix B for details). In the slow environ-
ment, competitors had relatively large planned sampling
sizes (mean of 30), following a bounded, discretized nor-
mal distribution with a standard deviation of 5. In the fast
environment, competitors had relatively small planned
sampling sizes (mean of 3.33) following a right-skewed
distribution. In the uncertain environment, competitors
had—with equal probability—any planned sampling size
from 1 to 50 (mean of 25.5). Finally, in the as-if solitary
environment, competitors had a right-skewed distribution
of sampling sizes (mean of 18). Fig. 3 (left panel) shows the
probability mass functions for each of these social
environments.5
The right panel of Fig. 3 shows the expected probability
than an agent obtains the H option given the planned sam-
pling size within a speciﬁc social environment. In a slow
environment, agents with a planned sampling size of 18
did best, with an 88.2% chance of obtaining H. In contrast,
in an uncertain environment, the best planned sampling
size was 6, with a 75.8% chance of obtaining H. In a fast5 For the purposes of the prescriptive analyses, these distributions can
represent either the variability in the behavior of one’s opponent from one
game to another, or the variability in the behavior of an entire population of
individual competitors. Assuming that an opponent’s sampling rule in each
game is an independent, random sample from its parent distribution, the
mathematics are the same whether we attribute variability to inter- or
intra-individual causes.














































Fig. 3. Left panel: Probability of an agent encountering a competitor with a given planned sampling size in the slow, fast, uncertain, and as-if solitary
environments (see text). Right panel: Results from the agent-based simulation averaged across 10,000 randomly generated decision problems. The x-axis
indicates the planned sampling size of an agent, and the y-axis shows the expected probability of obtaining the higher expected value option (H) as a
function of the planned sampling size in the four social environments. While lines are continuous, the underlying data is discrete.
6 Gender data were not recorded due to a programming error.
N.D. Phillips et al. / Cognition 133 (2014) 104–119 109environment, agents with a planned sampling size of just 1
did best, obtaining the H option 59% of the time. In the as-if
solitary environment, a planned sampling size of 4 proved
best, with a 73.8% chance of obtaining H. Finally the only
sampling size that ensures that one will obtain option H
with probability no less than .50, regardless of the behavior
of one’s competitor, is a sample size of just 1 using the
take-good-enough, otherwise-shift strategy.
These results show that players should dramatically
reduce exploration in a competitive context when they lack
clear information of their competitors’ intentions. Consider
for illustration the uncertain social environment, in which a
competitor is equally likely to stop anywherebetween1 and
50 samples (see Fig. 3, left panel). If an omnipotent player
knew exactly how long her competitor planned to sample,
then the best strategy would simply be to take one fewer
samples than her opponent. However, in this uncertain
social environment, the exact planned sampling size of the
opponent is unknown. What happens if a player plans to
sample one less than the expected planned sampling size
of her competitor? In this uncertain social environment
where the expected planned sampling size of a competitor
is 25.5, this rule would dictate a planned sampling size of
25. Reference to Fig. 3 (right panel) shows that this planned
sampling size constitutes dramatic oversampling, as the
best planned sampling size for this social environment is
only 6—less than one-fourth of the competitor’s expected
sampling size. In this example, planning to sample one
round less than the expected sampling size of one’s uncer-
tain competitor leads to oversampling by over 19 rounds.
The reason behind this dramatic effect of uncertainty about
the other agent’s actions on the best planned sampling size
is the disproportionate costs of over- versus undersampling.
To conclude, adaptive sampling in the competitive sam-
pling game depends on expectations of one’s competitors. If
competitors value accuracy highly and consequently repre-
sent a slow social environment, decision makers can afford
to gathermore information. Yet there is considerable asym-
metry in the costs of over- versus underestimating compet-
itors’ need for accuracy. In our choice ecology,
underestimating one’s competitor’s sampling size, no mat-
ter by what degree, will always ensure that one will be thechooser and thus more likely than not to obtain option H.
On the other hand, overestimating one’s competitor’s sam-
pling size, nomatter bywhat degree,will always ensure that
one will be the receiver and thus more likely than not to
obtain the short end of the stick (i.e., the lower expected
value option, L). For these reasons, we ﬁnd that it is better
to err on the side of underestimating the competitor’s sam-
pling size and minimizing the risk of being scooped.
These simulations show that competition presents a
substantial additional cost of search. Consequently, we
expect that real people will search much less in a compet-
itive compared to a solitary context. But how much more
restricted will it be? Will real people competing with oth-
ers decrease their search in a magnitude prescribed by our
simulations? Or will people be reluctant to decrease pre-
decisional search so dramatically? To answer this question,
we conducted an empirical study on the competitive sam-
pling game and compare the search behavior of people par-
ticipating in solitary to competitive games.3. An empirical investigation of the competitive
sampling game
3.1. Method
A total of 180 students from the University of Basel par-
ticipated in the study.6 They received a ﬂat fee of CHF 7.50
(approximately $8.12 at the time) for their participation, as
well as a bonus contingent on their winnings in the game.
The mean bonus across both experimental conditions was
CHF 1.18 (approximately $1.26) with a standard deviation
of CHF 1.19. Participants completed the study in groups of
four, each on a separate computer. They received no infor-
mation about the choice ecology prior to beginning the task.
All players began by playing three practice games without
ﬁnancial consequences to familiarize themselves with the
experimental interface (see Appendix C for practice game
parameters). They were then presented with ﬁve decision
tasks. Each decision task contained two, two-outcome
Table 1
Choice ecology.
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5
Gamble
set
H L H L H L H L H L
















































































































































































































































Note: Gamble sets used in both the solitary and the competitive conditions. Rows correspond to the 12 different combinations of decision tasks. H represents the higher expected value option, and L represents the
lower expected value option within each decision task. Each option is a discrete, twooutcome random variable with one positive and one negative outcome that occur with complementary probabilities. Values











Fig. 4. Distribution of sampling rounds across all decision tasks and
individuals, separately for the solitary and the competition conditions.
One sampling round value of 100 in the solitary condition is not
displayed. The 95% HDI interval for the solitary condition is plotted
‘behind’ the solitary sample mean.
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occurring with complementary probabilities. The gamble
sets were constructed such that in certain pairs the options
differed in expected value and in others they did not; like-
wise, in certain pairs the options differed in range and in
others they did not (see Appendix C for a full description
of how gamble parameters were selected). Three different
orders of each of the 12 gamble sets were created, resulting
in 36 unique experimental sessions (see Table 1). Location of
the urns on the screen was randomly determined for each
decision task and on each run.
At the outset of each decision task, participants saw two
options represented visually as opaque urns. Theywere told
that each urn contained 100 virtual balls, each of whichwas
worth a (not necessarily unique) number of points. Partici-
pants were informed that they would be rewarded with
one-tenth of the average value of all the balls in the urn they
chose (or were allocated). Each of the participants (n = 36)
assigned to the solitary condition completed one of the 36
unique experimental sessions. These participants could
sample from the urns as many times as they wished before
making a ﬁnal choice. Having made a ﬁnal choice of an urn
in a decision task, they moved onto the next task. The other
144participantsplayedeachdecision task in the competition
condition. At the beginning of each task, they were paired
randomlywith one of the other three participants. This pair-
ing was done independently between tasks. Players were
not told which person (of the three) they were playing
against in each decision task.
Every decision task, in both the solitary and competi-
tion conditions, began with one mandatory sampling
round. On every subsequent sampling round, each player
indicated whether he or she wanted to sample from an
urn or to make a ﬁnal choice. These decisions were made
privately and were only revealed to both players after both
had made a sampling or choice decision. If both wanted to
take a sample, they were asked to click on an urn and
viewed a randomly sampled outcome from that urn. Play-
ers could see which urn the other player sampled from, but
could not see the outcome the other player observed. If,
after observing a sample, both players wanted another
sample then another sampling round began. If one player
decided to make a ﬁnal choice (becoming the ‘‘chooser’’7),
she then selected the urn she wanted and her choice was
recorded. Subsequent to the chooser’s choice, the other
player (the ‘‘receiver’’) was informed that her competitor
had made a choice and that he must take the remaining non-
chosen urn. If both players made a choice on the same sam-
pling round, one of two outcomes was possible: If the two
players chose different urns, they each received the urn of
their choice. If both players chose the same urn, the two urns
were randomly assigned to the players. After ﬁnal choices
were made and players learned which urn they received,
they were randomly paired again and the next decision task
began. The random pairing was done independently of prior
rounds, so a player could play the same opponent on
sequential games. Participants did not receive immediate7 Players were not explicitly given the ‘‘chooser’’ and ‘‘receiver’’ labels in
the experiment.task-by-task feedback on how much money they won from
their chosen urns. At the end of the session, participants
were informed how much money they had earned across
the ﬁve decision tasks and were paid accordingly.
4. Results
We used Bayesian graphical modeling for all inferential
statistics. Bayesian posterior densities were calculated
using the R2Jags package in R. Posterior densities were cal-
culated with uninformative uniform priors, 10,000 itera-
tions, a burn-in value of 1000, and no thinning. We
conducted Bayesian hypothesis tests using Bayes Factors
calculated using the Savage–Dickey method for nested
model comparisons. We used the conventions developed
by Jeffreys (1961) to determine the categorical degrees of
strength indicated by Bayes Factors (BF). All raw data and
complete code are available in our online supplementary
materials. In the following sections,weﬁrst report on search
and thenonchoice, comparingbothbehaviors in the compe-
tition condition relative to the solitary condition.
4.1. How drastically do people restrict explorative behavior
under competition?
We measure exploration efforts by the number of sam-
pling rounds tasks lasted prior to a choice. For solitary
games, this is simply the number of samples the player
took. For competitive games, this is the number of sam-
pling rounds that occurred prior to the ﬁrst choice. Fig. 4
presents the distribution of sampling rounds across all
decision tasks in the solitary and competition conditions.
In the solitary condition, the median number of sampling
rounds was 18 (mean of 21.05; 95% highest density inter-
val [HDI]: 18.78, 23.67).8 In the competition condition, in8 The mean for the distribution of sampling sizes in the solitary condition
was calculated from the 95% HDIs for the p and r parameters in the negative
binomial distribution.
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(mean of 1.82; 95% HDI: 1.61, 2.08).9 The difference in sam-
ple means was 19.27 (95% HDI: 17.00, 21.92) and provides
extremely strong evidence against the hypothesis that the
means of the two distributions were the same (BF > 100).
Thus, the amount of sampling by participants who were
competing for resources was dramatically lower than that
of participants who were searching alone.10Fig. 5. Proportions of tasks where players obtained the higher expected
value (H) option in the solitary and the competition conditions. Error bars
represent 95% highest density intervals for the population probability.4.2. How much does very restricted search compromise
decision quality?
To see how the restricted search in the competition
condition affected decision quality, we calculated how
often choosers in the competition condition chose the H
option relative to receivers and to participants in the soli-
tary condition. These results are presented in Fig. 5. In the
solitary condition, players chose the H option in 71% (95%
HDI: 64%, 78%) of decision tasks. This result constitutes
extremely strong evidence for the hypothesis that partici-
pants in the solitary condition were more likely than
chance to choose the H option (BF > 100). Next we analyze
the outcomes for choosers and receivers in the competition
condition. In cases where players chose the same option
simultaneously, one player was randomly assigned to be
the chooser (and obtained the option both chose) and the
remaining player was assigned to be the receiver (and
obtained the alternative option). Choosers obtained the H
option in 58% of decision tasks (95% HDI: 53%, 63%)—fewer
than in the solitary condition (BF = 12.36, strong evidence),
but more than would be expected by chance alone
(BF = 8.90, moderate evidence).9 The mean for the distribution of sampling sizes in the competition
condition was calculated from the 95% HDIs for the p parameter in the
geometric distribution.
10 The fact that sampling rounds decreased in competition relative to
solitary conditions, is necessary, but not sufﬁcient evidence that compe-
tition reduced individual sampling decisions. The reason for this lies in how
sampling rounds are deﬁned. Under competition, sampling rounds are
deﬁned at the level of pairs of participants rather than individual
participants. Because sampling rounds are restricted by the behavior of
the fastest player in a pair, we would expect a decrease in sampling rounds
in the competitive task relative to the solitary task even if players did not
change their sampling rules. For example, if two players employ ﬁxed-N
rules of 5 and 10, respectively, across solitary and competitive games, the
average number of sampling rounds in the solitary games would be 7.5,
while the average number of sampling rounds under competition would
(always) be 5. To test whether or not this shrinkage effect could explain the
different distributions of sampling rounds between solitary and competi-
tion conditions, we generated all possible pairs of sampling rounds from
the solitary game and calculated the minimum sampling round number
from each pair. This represented the expected distribution of sampling
rounds in the competition condition if behavior was the same as in the
solitary condition. The median number of sampling rounds in this
distribution was 11 (mean of 12.61, 95% HDI: 12.45, 12.76). The difference
in the mean sampling rounds between this distribution and the observed
distribution for the competition condition was 10.76 (95% HDI: 10.49,
11.06), thus offering extremely strong evidence against the hypothesis that
the means of the two distributions are the same (BF > 100). We conclude
that the difference between the mean number of sampling rounds in the
competition condition and the solitary condition was due not only to the
rules of the competitive game (i.e., the fastest player determines sample
size) but also to the fact that competition per se shifted the balance from
exploration to exploitation.Thus, the reduced information available to fast choosers
in the competitive condition indeed reduced their choice
performance relative to solitary choosers. Nevertheless,
as choosers took the better option at above chance level,
receivers obtained option H in only 42% (95% HDI: .37,
.47) of cases11 This is consistent with our simulation
analysis (Fig. 3, right panel) showing that fast choosing is
advantageous under competitive conditions.4.3. How did players make choices based on minimal
information?
The following analyses focus on the competition condi-
tion only. To further analyze the speciﬁc decisions that
produced the distribution of sampling rounds in the
competition condition, we looked at how quickly players
terminated sampling. For each of the 720 decision tasks
(144 participants  5 decision tasks each), we recorded
the total number of sampling rounds that occurred in the
task, and whether players were choosers or receivers (i.e.,
two choosers or one chooser and one receiver). We found
that in 32% (227 of 720) of all cases, participants were
choosers who decided to choose immediately after the ﬁrst
sampling round. Of these choices, 88% (200 of 227) were
consistent with the take good enough, otherwise-shift heu-
ristic. The remaining 12% (27 out of 227) either chose an
option with an observed negative value, or did not choose
an option with an observed positive value. In 22% (159 of
720) of all cases, participants were receivers after the ﬁrst
sampling round, because they opted to continue sampling
while their competitors decided to choose. Participants
made it to the second round in only 46% (334 of 720) of
cases. Of these 334 participants, 34% (113 of 334) were11 Receivers did not receive option H at a percentage exactly equal to one
minus the percentage that choosers wanted option H (which was 57%). This
is due to the effects of simultaneous choosing by choosers. In games where
both players simultaneously chose option H, both wanted option H, but
only one player got it.
Table 2
Distribution of participant-level proportion of decision tasks ending with a choice.
0/5 1/5 2/5 3/5 4/5 5/5
2 (1.4%) 16 (11.1%) 34 (23.6%) 45 (31.3%) 30 (20.8%) 17 (11.8%)
N.D. Phillips et al. / Cognition 133 (2014) 104–119 113choosers who decided to stop sampling, 25% (82 of 334)
were receivers, and 41% (139 of 334) ‘‘survived’’ to the
third sampling round. This analysis demonstrates that,
while not all choosing decisions were made after one
round (as prescribed by the analysis of the fast environ-
ment; Fig. 3), people indeed drastically conﬁned their
information search, and to a greater extent than prescribed
by the uncertain and solitary search environments.
What makes people decide to choose after just one
sample versus to continue sampling? Our data suggest
the valence of the ﬁrst sample inﬂuences this decision. Of
the 261 cases in which a player experienced a positive out-
come in the ﬁrst sample, he or she stopped sampling and
chose immediately in 130 cases (50%; 95% HDI: 44%,
56%). Of the 459 cases in which a player experienced a neg-
ative outcome in the ﬁrst sample, he or she stopped sam-
pling in only 97 cases (21%; 95% HDI: 18%, 25%). Thus,
players were more willing to immediately choose an
option with a known positive outcome than they were to
reject an option with a known negative outcome and take
a completely uncertain option (BF > 100, extreme evi-
dence)—perhaps a manifestation of aversion to ambiguity
(Ellsberg, 1961).12 We thank Jonathan Nelson for pointing this out.4.4. How closely did players pursue a single strategy?
Next, we examined how consistent individual partici-
pants were in their behavior across tasks. In the competi-
tive sampling game, some players could always try be
the chooser, while others might require so much pre-deci-
sional information that they always defer the choice to
their competitor. To see if people had stable choosing ver-
sus receiving outcomes, we calculated the percentage of all
5 games that each participant was a chooser. Table 2
reports the distribution of these percentages across indi-
viduals. We found little evidence that people’s search strat-
egies resulted in stable outcomes across decision tasks.
Only 19 individuals (13.2%) were either always choosers
(17) or always receivers (2), while the remaining 86.8%
ended some tasks as the chooser and other tasks as the
receiver.
Next, we determined whether and how individuals
changed their behavior across the tasks. For example, if a
player ended up as a receiver in one task, did she decrease
her sampling in order to increase the chance of being a
chooser in the subsequent task? In contrast, did the choo-
ser take the liberty of sampling a little more in the next
task? To answer this question, we calculated the marginal
probability that a player was the chooser each task in addi-
tion to the probability of being the chooser conditional on
his or her status in the previous task (i.e., chooser versus
receiver). If behavior in a game changes as a function of
the outcome in the previous game, we would expect differ-
ences in the conditional probability of choosing when a
player was a chooser in the previous game compared tobeing a receiver in the previous game. Table 3 reports the
results.
We begin by looking at the marginal probability of
choosing across decision tasks. If players adjust their
explorative efforts downward with each round, the proba-
bility that they end games by choosing (rather than receiv-
ing) should increase and converge toward 1. We did not
ﬁnd substantial evidence for this, as the probability of
choosing oscillated between around 57% and 61% across
tasks. Next, we looked at the probability of choosing, con-
ditioned on the outcome of the previous task. We found no
evidence that being a receiver in one round prompted less
search and a higher probability of being the chooser in the
next task. In other words, we do not ﬁnd clear evidence
that players changed their behavior across tasks based on
experience. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is
that, although players were told whether they were the
chooser or the receiver in any given round, they did not
receive immediate feedback on the direct monetary conse-
quences of their behavior. Without immediate consequen-
tial feedback, players may not have had sufﬁcient
information to adjust their sampling strategies.5. General discussion
We designed the competitive sampling game to extend
the sampling paradigm used in research on decision from
experience (see Hertwig & Erev, 2009) to competitive deci-
sion tasks under uncertainty. The task enables researchers
to investigate how people adapt their exploration efforts in
response to the simultaneous presence of uncertainty
about nature (i.e., the parameters of the payoff distribu-
tion) and uncertainty about the social environment of
competitors (i.e., their desire for accuracy versus their
desire to beat their competitors to the punch). In our initial
research using the game, we found that competition dra-
matically affects the exploration–exploitation tradeoff. In
a simulation analysis, we found that sampling sizes as
low as 1 or 2 can be best in certain environments when
people compete with others for advantageous options.
Empirically, our participants showed dramatically reduced
search in competitive task compared to solitary one.5.1. Varying the number of players and options
In our experiment and simulations, we contrasted a sol-
itary task with one player and two options, with a compet-
itive task with two players and two options. One could
wonder whether it is merely the presence of competition,
or the ratio between competitors and the number of avail-
able options that drives the need for speedy decisions.12 A
moment’s reﬂection makes it clear that good sampling rules
Table 3









2 83 (57.6%) 48 (58.5%) 35 (56.4%)
3 87 (60.4%) 51 (61.4%) 36 (59.0%)
4 83 (57.6%) 54 (62.1%) 29 (50.9%)
5 89 (61.8%) 55 (66.3%) 34 (55.7%)
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and the number of competitors: If there are many options
available relative to players, then one can take more time
for sampling, knowing that even if all other players make
quick decisions, there will likely be many good options
remaining. To ﬁnd out the relationship between the number
of competitors and number of options on good decision
speed, we ran a supplementary set of simulations in which
we systematically manipulated three factors: number of
players (from 2 to 5), number of options (from 2 to 5) and
the speed of competition (fast, uncertain, and slow). For each
factor combination, we simulated the performance of an
agent using a ﬁxed sampling size of 1 through 15. In contrast
to our previous simulations, we now deﬁne performance as
the average expected reward the agent obtained across all
simulations.13 Details of the simulation are in Appendix E.
We present the main results of the simulation in Fig. 6.
Each plot shows an agent’s planned sampling size on the
horizontal axis, and the agent’s expected reward on the
vertical axis. Each line corresponds to a different social
environment, mirroring three of the four (excluding the
as-if solitary condition) from our earlier simulations (see
left panel of Fig. 3). Plots in each column refer to different
numbers of players, from 2 to 5, while plots in each row
refer to different numbers of options, from 2 to 5. The
top left graph (2 players and 2 options) replicates the same
social and environmental structure as our initial simula-
tion. Within each plot, the sampling size that maximizes
an agent’s expected rewards for each social environment
is highlighted with an enlarged point.
We brieﬂy summarize 4 key results from Fig. 6. First,
holding the number of players constant, as the number of
options increases the best sampling sizes tend to increase.
Additionally, the expected reward given the best sampling
size increases as well. This means that the more options
there are, the longer one should search, and the better
one’s expected outcomes will be. Second, holding the num-
ber of options constant, as the number of players increases
the best sampling sizes tend to decrease. Both of these
results support our prior intuitions: the degree to which
people should reduce sampling in the presence of compe-
tition depends on the number of options available and
the number of other players.13 We use expected reward instead of the probability of obtaining the
highest expected value option for two reasons. First, organisms frequently
want to obtain good options, not necessarily the best option. Second, as the
number options increases, the probability that any player will discover and
take the highest expected value option will necessarily decrease. This
makes it more difﬁcult to compare performance between option number
conditions.Next, we look at the effect of the player/option ratio on
performance. If the ratio of players to options remains the
same, does the absolute number of players and options
matter? We ﬁnd that indeed, there is a substantial effect.
Consider games where the player: option is 1:1. Here, we
ﬁnd that as the absolute number of players and options
increases, the risk involved with taking large samples
increases in a fast environment, but decreases in a slow
one. To see this, compare the expected rewards of having
a large (15) sampling size in the 2:2 game (top left panel)
compared to the 5:5 game (bottom right panel). In the 2:2
game, extensive search against slow competition leads to
an expected reward of around 20, while the same level of
search against fast opponents leads to an expected loss of
around 10. Here, the difference in expected rewards
against slow and fast opponents is 30. Now consider the
5:5 game. Here, the expected reward against slow oppo-
nents increases to around 35, while the expected loss
against fast opponents decreases to around 15. Now, the
difference in expected rewards between competitors is
50, an increase of 66% in the range of potential outcomes
compared to the smaller 2:2 game. This means that when
the absolute number of players and options increases,
while keeping the player to options ratio 1:1, both the
potential beneﬁts one can gain using extensive search
against slow competition increases while the potential
losses on can suffer against fast competition increases. In
other words, the more players and options are in the game,
the more risk one runs (with ‘risk’ deﬁned as the difference
between the expected reward with the best sample size
and with the largest sample size) by extensive search, in
fast and uncertain environments. Independently of this
effect, the main result from our previous analyses still
hold—the faster you expect your opponents to decide, the
faster you should decide, regardless of how many options
and how many players are in the game.
Next, we consider games where there are more players
than options. These games are akin to real-world problems
such as house-hunting and mate-search where there may
be more ‘buyers’ than ‘sellers.’ For example,14 in Beijing,
men outnumber women, and thus (heterosexual) men ﬁnd
themselves in a competitive game with more players than
options (Jacobs, 2011). Assuming that options cannot be
shared among players, these games necessitate that some
players will leave without an option of their own. In our sim-
ulation, we assumed that these players receive neither
rewards nor losses from leaving empty-handed. However,
one can easily imagine real world decisions where this
assumption does not hold. If you are competing with others
for one of three open positions at a company, it might be
much worse to get no job at all than to get a random (or
even the worst) job of the three. Similarly, in mate-selection,
leaving empty-handed could very well be the worst possible
outcome from an evolutionary perspective. To incorporate
this cost, one could assign a ﬁxed negative loss for players
that leave the game empty-handed, with larger losses repre-
senting domains where it is especially bad to leave with
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Fig. 6. Simulation results depicting the expected reward (vertical axes) of an agent in the competitive sampling game given a speciﬁed sampling size
(horizontal axes). Separate plots in each column correspond to different numbers of players in the game, while separate plots in each row correspond to
different numbers of options in the game. Solid, dashed, and dotted lines refer to the slow, uncertain, and fast social environments respectively.
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of leaving empty-handed increases, sampling sizes should
decrease.
5.2. Alternative search and decision rules
In our simulations, we assumed that players used a
‘‘ﬁxed-N’’ sampling rule. That is, players were assumed to
have a ﬁxed sampling size threshold that they had to reach
before making a decision. Additionally, we assumed that
players distribute their samples equally between options.
We chose to limit our analyses to this simple class ofsearch rules as a starting point for exploring the effects
of different exploration efforts on performance. Of course,
the ﬁxed-N sampling rule plus equal allocation constitutes
just one of many possible search rules people are likely to
use. For example, one promising, more complex, class of
search rules are those that compare sample statistics with
an information threshold in order to decide whether to
stop or to continue sampling. These rules have been found
to be promising both normatively and descriptively (e.g.,
Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988). While we cannot claim that
ﬁxed-N sampling rules represent either the best approach
to the competitive sampling game or that most
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rules will mimic the behavior of more complex search
rules. For example, a ﬁxed-1 rule should behave very sim-
ilarly to a rule that says ‘‘Always try to choose before your
opponent’’ or ‘‘Choose after the difference in sample means
is greater than e (where e is a small threshold).’’ Similarly, a
Fixed-30 rule will behave similarly to a conservative rule
such as: ‘‘Choose when the expected probability of choos-
ing the best option is greater than p (where p is a large
probability).’’ Here is our point: to the extent that small
ﬁxed-N values mimic search rules that make do with min-
imal information before making a decision, and large ﬁxed-
N rules mimic those that require extensive information,
our conclusion that competition should and does reduce
the amount of information people require before making
a decision should hold.
Finally, we did not deal with agents’ expectations con-
cerning their competitor’s search behavior Rather, we took
the competitor sampling size distributions as given, and
determined which sampling size best responds to them.
We do suspect that real people in competitive tasks (in
our empirical study and in the real world) try to predict
the sampling size of their opponents and, through some
iterated process of strategic thinking (e.g., Ho, Camerer, &
Weigelt, 1998) settle on a sampling size. Future research
should model the processes by which a person generates
expectations of other player’s behavior, translates those
expectations into a decision rule, and after gaining experi-
ences, updates their expectations.
5.3. When will very frugal search fail?
Our simulation results are based on aggregation across
speciﬁc distributions of gambles and are only valid within
those distributions. It is clear that other gamble distribu-
tions can lead to very different results. One important fac-
tor is how much the gamble distributions are favorable for
decisions based on small samples; if options are
‘unfriendly‘ to small samples, then our previous conclu-
sions will not hold. The gamble distributions in our stimuli
and empirical study, were indeed small-sample-friendly.
When averaged over 10,000 simulated pairs of gambles,
we found that a sample size of 1 results in an expected rate
of obtaining the H option of greater than .50 (see Fig. 1).
Thus, we created an environment where a sample of size
1 using the take-good-enough, otherwise-shift rule was,
on average, sufﬁcient. However, this success rate does
not generalize to any gamble environment. In Appendix
D, we show that only gamble pairs where the sum of the
probability of obtaining a positive outcome from option
H and the probability of obtaining a negative outcome from
option L is greater than 1 guarantees an expected probabil-
ity of choosing the H option that is greater than .50 (see
proof in Appendix D). We label gamble pairs that satisfy
this condition as ‘‘one-sample favorable.’’ In our simula-
tions, the proportion of gamble pairs that were one-sample
favorable was .787; in these gambles, the probability of
choosing option H using one sample was .688. The remain-
ing portion of gamble pairs that were not one-sample
favorable was thus .213; in these gambles, the probability
of choosing option H using one sample .414. This resulthighlights the fact that the accuracy of decisions based
on very small samples will depend on the speciﬁc distribu-
tions encountered by agents.
One of the most important ﬁndings from early research
on decisions from experience was that, in experience-
based decisions, low-probability (rare) events appear to
receive less impact than they deserve in light of their
objective probability (Hertwig et al., 2004). This effect is,
among other factors (Hertwig & Erev, 2009), caused by
the fact that people do not search long enough to experi-
ence rare events often enough or at all during search. For-
mally, in environments where the ranks of most samples
from each option diverge greatly from the true rank of
options’ long-term average values, choosing based on a
small sampling size can lead to a small probability of
obtaining the H option. In other words, in gambles where
small samples (e.g., a single date with a potential mate, a
glance at a TV on sale) produce data that are inconsistent
with an option’s long-term value (e.g., a disastrous ﬁrst
date with Mr. or Ms. Right, a paid celebrity endorsement
of a low-quality product), frugal predecision sampling
can lead people to choose poor options. For example, con-
sider a payoff distribution that delivers +1 with probability
.9 and 100 with probability .1 and thus has an expected
value of 9.1. Small samples are unlikely to reveal the rare
but large negative outcome of 100, making the distribu-
tion look advantageous to most agents that inspect it only
brieﬂy. This suggests that fast choosers in competitive
environments involving rare events run the risk of choos-
ing options that appear beneﬁcial in the short term but
have detrimental long-term consequences resulting from
rare but impactful negative events (e.g., ‘‘black swans’’;
Taleb, 2007). Indeed, in such environments, a player could
even beneﬁt from competing against others who are
‘‘tricked’’ into grabbing options with apparent short-term
gains, but actual long-term losses.
6. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings suggest that competition shifts the balance
between exploration and exploitation in an uncertain
choice environment: Faced with the threat of being outp-
aced in the process of making a decision, people dramati-
cally reduce search. As our results show, this is a smart
thing to do in ecologies in which competitors can be
expected to choose quickly, and modal samples are good
indicators of an option’s value. Although exploitation
means forgoing the beneﬁts of exploration that can be
enjoyed in solitary situations, those who seize the ﬁrst-
mover advantage do better than those who do not in many
(but, of course, not all) competitive situations. It is a pro-
verbial truth that you should ‘‘look before you leap’’ (see
also Savage, 1954/1972, p. 16). In our competitive environ-
ment, it emerged that a quick peek before leaping was very
helpful—but that more extensive looking permitted the
competitor to leap ﬁrst and gain an edge.
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Appendix A
A.1. Calculating the expected probability of obtaining option H
given a choice ecology and social environment
We calculated a player’s expected probability of obtain-
ing the option with the higher expected value (H) given its
planned sampling size using Eq. (1):
pðHjniÞ ¼ pðHjnc > niÞ  pðnc > niÞ þ pðHjnc
< niÞ  pðnc < niÞ þ pðHjnc ¼ niÞ  pðnc ¼ niÞ ð1Þ
Eq. (1) represents the weighted sum of three possible
scenarios that differ with respect to the relationship
between the player’s planned sampling size (ni) and the
planned sampling size of the competitor (nc), that is,
whether the player faces an opponent with a smaller, lar-
ger, or the same planned sampling size.
The ﬁrst half of the ﬁrst term in Eq. (1) corresponds to
the probability of obtaining the H option given that the
competitor will sample longer than the player, and, conse-
quently, the probability that the player will obtain H
equals that of choosing the H option given ni samples.
Because choices are based on sample means, this equals
the probability that the order of the sample means from
the two options matches the order of the population
means. In this case, the option with the higher sample
mean will also be the option with the higher popula-
tion mean and the player will choose the better option.
Formally:
PðHjnc > niÞ ¼ pðxH > xLjniÞ ð2Þ
Note that this calculation is speciﬁc to the choice ecology
under consideration. For two outcome payoff distributions
such as those used here, this can be calculated directly by
comparing the results of two binomial distributions. The
second half of the ﬁrst term is the weight given to this out-
come, deﬁned as the probability of encountering an oppo-
nent with a larger sample size than the player’s sample size.
The remaining two terms in Eq. (1) follow the same logic.
When the competitor samples less than theplayer, theprob-
ability that the player obtains theH option is the probability
that the competitorwill not choose theH option. This equals
the probability that the opponent observes sample meansPractice 1 Practice 2
H L H
(32, .458, 13) (39, .352, 18) (47, .417, 25)whose order is not equal to the true order of population
means and can be calculated as follows:
pðHjnc < niÞ ¼ pðxH < xLjncÞ ð3Þ
Finally, the third term in Eq. (1) represents the expected
outcome when both players have the same sampling size.
This is set to .5 and is independent of the sampling distri-
butions of payoff distributions H and L (=lower expected
value distribution):
pðHjnc ¼ niÞ ¼ :5 ð4ÞAppendix B
B.1. Distributions of planned sampling sizes for competitive
social environments
In the fast environment F, the probability that a ran-
domly sampled agent has a planned sampling size nk is
given by a geometric distribution with p = .3, ranging from
1 to 50 and normalized to sum to 1:
f ðF ¼ nkÞ ¼ ð1 :3Þ
nj1  :3P50
i¼1ð1 :3Þi1  :3
nk ¼ 1;2; . . . ;50
In the slow environment S, the probability that a ran-
domly sampled agent has a planned sampling size nk is a
reﬂected version of F around the point nk = 25.5:
f ðS ¼ nkÞ ¼ ð1 :3Þ
50nk1  :3P50
i¼1ð1 :3Þi1  3
nk ¼ 1;2; . . . ;50
In the uncertain environment U, the probability that a
randomly sampled agent has a planned sampling size nk
is given by the discrete, uniform distribution with bounds
at 1 and 50:
f ðU ¼ nkÞ ¼ 150 nk ¼ 1;2; . . . ;50
In the as-if solitary environment A, the probability that a
randomly sampled agent has a planned sampling size nk is
given by a negative binomial distribution with p = .071 and











ð1 :071Þ1:59  :071i
nk ¼1;2; . . . ;50Appendix C
C.1. Properties of the practice gamesPractice 3
L H L
(42, .349, 21) 53, .407, 24) (35, .458, 17)
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We started out with four binary-valued options, labeled
A1–A4. Their values were (17, 37), (20, 43), (23, 49),
and (26, 55), for options A1 through A4, respectively.
Each of these options had three versions, differing in
expected value; the expected values were high (EV = 7),
medium (EV = 2), or low (EV = 3). The three EVs were
obtained by modifying the probabilities of the two out-
comes. Additionally, each A option had a corresponding B
option, for which the two values spanned a smaller range
(hence, smaller variance); the range of the B option was
about 2/3 that of the corresponding A option. We then con-
structed 12 gamble sets, each comprising ﬁve decision
tasks (displayed in Table 1). One involved a choice between
an A option with an EV of 7 and a B option with an EV of 3
(e.g., A1High and B1Low); a second involved a choice
between another A option and its corresponding B option,
in which the A option had the low EV and the B option the
high EV (e.g., A3Low and B3High); a third involved a choice
between another A and B pair in which the two were both
of the medium value, with EV = 2 (e.g., A2Medium and
B2Medium); a fourth involved a choice between two (large
variance) A options belonging to the same set but differing
in value (e.g., A4High and A4Low); a ﬁfth involved a choice
between two (small variance) B options belonging to the
same set but differing in value (e.g., B4High and B4Low).
There were 12 such sets, and we used them all.Appendix D
D.1. Conditions that make decision tasks one-sample
favorable
Consider an environment containing two gambles
(options)H and L, where E(H) > E(L). Assume a player selects
a gamble at random and draws a random sample. Let the
random variable S represent the selected option where
S e {H, L}. Let the random variable X e R be outcome drawn
be the outcome drawn from the selected gamble. Finally,
let the random variable C e {H, L} be the chosen option.
Consider a player using a one-sample search and deci-
sion rule: (1) Select an option at random and draw one
sample. (2) If the sample value is positive, choose the selected
option. If the sample value is negative, chose the unselected
option. From the law of total probability, the probability
that player will choose option H can be written as the
sum of the probabilities of two disjoint events:
pðC ¼ HÞ ¼ pðS¼ HÞpðX > 0jS¼ HÞ þ pðS¼ LÞpðX < 0jS¼ LÞ
Because options are selected at random,
p(S = H) = p(S = L) = .50:
pðC ¼ HÞ ¼ :5pðX > 0jS ¼ HÞ þ :5pðX < 0jS ¼ LÞ
Moving terms around
pðC ¼ HÞ ¼ :5ðpðX > 0jS ¼ HÞÞ þ pðX < 0jS ¼ LÞ
It follows that for p(C = H) to be greater than .50,
p(X > 0|S = H) + p(X > 0|S = L) must be greater than 1.0.Appendix E
E.1. Second simulation procedure
We simulated the performance of agents with varying
ﬁxed sampling sizes playing the competitive samplinggame
against varying numbers of competitors, number of options,
and competitor speed. The key parameters we varied were:
N.Players (2, 3, 4, 5, 6): the number of competitors in the
game. N.Options (2, 3, 4, 5, 6): the number of options (gam-
bles) in the game. Competition.Speed (Slow, Uniform, Fast):
the decision speed of competitors. This created 72 simula-
tion classes. For each simulation class, we simulated the
decision performance of 15 agents playing the competitive
sampling game, each using a ﬁxed sample size of 1–15. We
aggregated each agent’s performance over 5000 stochastic
factors: (1) the outcome distributions within each of the
(N.Options) options and (2) the speciﬁc stopping rules of
its (N.Competitors) competitors. Each option represented a
discrete, two-outcome gamble with one positive and one
negative outcome, each occurring with complementary
probabilities. For each of the options, we drew a positive
outcome from Unif(0, 100) and a random negative outcome
from Unif(100, 0). We then drew the probability of the
positive outcome (p+) fromUnif(0, 1) and set the probability
of the negative outcome (p) to 1  p+. We constructed the
probability mass function for each option independently of
other options. For each of the competitors, we drew a sam-
ple size from its corresponding decision speed distribution
(Slow, Uniform, or Fast). These distributions corresponded
to those in Appendix B
Each game proceeded as follows: agents sampled
equally from options until the ﬁrst player reached its sam-
pling size. That agent then choose the option with the
highest observed sample mean (with ties broken at ran-
dom). In the case where two agents stopped at the same
time, one of two outcomes could occur: If they wanted dif-
ferent options, they each got their desired option. If they
wanted the same option, then the desired option was ran-
domly given to one agent, and the remaining agent then
attempted to take is next most desired option. After all
agents who stopped on that round received an option,
the game continued with the remaining players and
options. At the end of each game, each agent got the
expected value of its chosen option. In the games where
there were more players than options, if a player ends
the game with no option (because all options were taken
by other players), then it received a reward of 0.Appendix F. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.cognition.2014.06.006.References
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